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The Role of Trust in the Post-Acquisition Integration Process:  
A Case Survey  
 
This study addresses the largely neglected, but potentially critical, role that trust 
plays in acquisitions. We present a model that synthesizes existing research on the 
factors that influence the post-acquisition integration process, with target firm 
members’ trust in the acquiring firm’s management as a key mediating variable. The 
results of a case survey suggest that while aspects of the acquirer-target relationship, 
such as the pre-acquisition performance differences, power asymmetries, and 
combining firms’ collaboration history, are poor predictors of trust, integration 
process variables such as the speed of integration, communication quality, and 
cultural tolerance and sensitivity exhibited by the acquirer are major factors 
influencing target firm members’ trust in the acquiring firm’s management. Mediator 
analyses revealed that trust mediates the effects of the integration process variables 
on post-acquisition integration outcomes. 
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The Role of Trust in the Post-Acquisition Integration Process: A Case Survey 
For the past three decades, there has been a growing body of research on the variables that affect 
the success of mergers and acquisitions [M&A]. However, the key factors for success and the 
reasons why M&A often fail remain poorly understood. A meta-analysis by King et al. (2004) of 
93 published studies found that none of the most commonly studied antecedent variables were 
significant in predicting post-acquisition performance. King et al. conclude that “despite decades 
of research, what impacts the financial performance of firms engaging in M&A activity remains 
largely unexplained” (2004: 198). 
While attempts to explain M&A success and failure have traditionally focused on strategic and 
financial factors, more recently research attention has shifted to the less tangible psychological, 
sociocultural and human resources issues involved in M&A. Variables such as cultural fit, the 
pattern of dominance between merging firms, the social climate surrounding a takeover, as well 
as acculturation, sensemaking and learning processes have increasingly been recognized to be 
critical to the success of M&A (e.g., Birkinshaw, Bresman & Håkanson, 2000; Björkman, Tienari 
& Vaara, 2005; Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Morosini, Shane 
& Singh, 1998; Olie, 1990; Vaara, 2003; Weber, Shenkar & Raveh, 1996). However, one variable 
that is likely to play a key role in the post-merger integration process has been left largely 
unexplored: trust. Although there is a large body of evidence about the critical role that trust 
plays in alliances (e.g., Child, 2001; Currall & Inkpen, 2004; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998), 
little is known about the factors that facilitate or hinder the development of trust in acquisitions. 
The benefits of trust and the damage incurred by trust violations (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Sitkin & 
Stickel, 1996) make it essential to understand the conditions under which trust can develop 
following a corporate takeover. In this paper, we develop a model that synthesizes our current 
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understanding of the antecedents and consequences of trust in acquisitions, and test it using the 
case survey method. 
TRUST IN THE POST-ACQUISITION INTEGRATION PROCESS 
In this study, we define trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998: 395). Conversely, distrust can be defined as negative 
expectations of another’s intentions or behavior (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). As trust 
scholars have noted, the risk of negative outcomes must be present for trust to operate, and the 
trustor must be willing to be vulnerable. In the absence of risk, trust is irrelevant because there is 
no vulnerability (Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). 
This conceptualization of trust has been applied to interorganizational relationships. For 
example, in joint ventures, open communication and information exchange, task coordination, 
informal agreements, and levels of surveillance and monitoring are all manifestations of trust 
based on a willingness to rely on or be vulnerable to the other party under a condition of risk 
(Currall & Inkpen, 2002). In the context of M&A, there is a large body of anecdotal evidence in 
the form of case studies (e.g., Chua, Stahl & Engeli, 2005; Olie, 1994) and interviews with 
acquired managers and employees (e.g., Krug & Nigh, 2001; Schweiger et al., 1987) that suggest 
that the period following the announcement of an M&A is one of intense risk assessment in 
which trust is easily damaged and difficult to restore. With a new organization, a new top 
management team and a new superior, there is little trust initially and employees are left 
wondering what the next wave of changes will bring and whether they should leave the 
organization or stay (Hurley, 2006). The following quote from Daniel Vasella, CEO of Novartis, 
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concerning the merger that created the pharmaceutical giant highlights both the importance and 
fragility of trust in M&A: 
Only in a climate of trust are people willing to strive for the slightly impossible, to 
take decisions on their own, to take initiative, to feel accountable.  … Among all 
the corporate values, trust was the one that suffered most from the merger. … To 
create a culture based on trust takes time; it requires dedication and the right 
mindset. We must earn it by ‘walking the talk’, with candor, integrity, openness 
and fairness, as well as with credible, consistent and convincing behavior. (Chua et 
al., 2005: 391-392) 
Figure 1 depicts the model developed in the following discussion. It focuses on the relationship 
between the two main parties involved in an acquisition: the top management of the acquiring 
firm or, in the case of a merger, the dominant partner (henceforth, acquiring firm management); 
and the employees of the acquired firm or, in the case of a merger, the subordinate partner 
(henceforth, target firm members). The model proposes that target firm members’ trust in the 
acquiring firm’s management is affected by a set of factors related to the acquirer-target 
relationship, as well as process variables related to the acquirer’s integration approach. The 
model further suggests that the degree to which target firm members trust the acquiring firm’s 
management will affect a variety of attitudinal, behavioral and performance outcomes. The 
distinction between status variables (i.e., characteristics of the initial takeover situation) and 
integration process variables is consistent with current theory on M&A integration. A “process 
perspective” (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) on 
acquisitions suggests that while factors such as strategic, organizational, and cultural fit 
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determine the potential for synergies, the extent to which that potential is realized depends on the 
ability of the acquirer to manage the integration process in an effective manner. 
_________________ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
_________________ 
Antecedents of Target Firm Members’ Trust in the Acquiring Firm’s Management  
Next, we will explore how factors related to the acquirer-target relationship may affect target 
firm members’ trust in the acquiring firm’s management. 
Collaboration history. Trust evolves over time through repeated interactions between partners 
(Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Zaheer, McEvily & 
Perrone, 1998). Not unlike romantic relationships, interfirm relationships mature with interaction 
frequency, duration, and the diversity of challenges that partners encounter and face together 
(Lewicki, McAllister & Blies, 1998). As Rousseau et al. (1998: 399) have noted, “[r]epeated 
cycles of exchange, risk taking, and successful fulfillment of expectations strengthen the 
willingness of trusting parties to rely upon each other and expand the resources brought into the 
exchange”. Furthermore, partners come to learn each other’s idiosyncrasies and develop deeper 
mutual understanding over time, which improves the affective quality of the relationship (Inkpen 
& Currall, 2004; Parkhe, 1993). This indirect evidence from the alliance literature suggests that 
in acquisitions, familiarity through prior collaboration, e.g., in the form of a joint venture, may 
facilitate the emergence trust between the members of the two organizations. However, trust can 
be expected to emerge between organizations only when they have successfully completed 
transactions in the past and they perceive one another as complying with norms of equity (Ring 
& Van de Ven, 1992). If members of the target firm and the acquiring firm had a conflict-rich or 
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inequitable exchange prior to the acquisition, this is likely to limit the potential for trust to 
emerge. Taken together, these arguments support the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The longer and more positive the history of collaboration between the two firms, 
the higher the level of trust that target firm members have in the acquiring firm’s management. 
Mode of takeover. Although prior acquisition research has not directly addressed the 
relationship between mode of takeover and trust, it has been argued that hostile takeover tactics 
can result in sharp interorganizational conflict and difficulties integrating the acquired company 
(Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Hitt et al., 2001). The tone of the negotiations – whether the tone 
is friendly or hostile – is an important influence on the post-acquisition integration process 
because of its effect on the quality of the interpersonal relationships between the members of the 
two organizations (Hunt, 1990). Friendliness is likely to generate perceptions of openness, 
goodwill, and trustworthiness (Buono & Bowditch, 1989). In contrast, trust can erode when 
executives from a hostile takeover target and the acquiring firm battle each other in a public 
forum, each being suspicious of the other’s intentions and claiming the other party’s inadequacy 
and lack of integrity. Hambrick and Cannella (1993) have observed that the atmosphere 
surrounding a hostile takeover is often characterized by bitterness and acrimony, making smooth 
social integration and successful trust building after the deal less likely. These arguments support 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The friendlier the mode of takeover, the higher the level of trust that target 
firm members have in the acquiring firm’s management. 
Power differential. A power differential between the two organizations involved in an 
acquisition reflects the extent to which there can be a unidirectionality of influence from acquirer 
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to target. The capability and tendency of the acquiring firm for exercising power to enforce its 
preferences upon the target is particularly strong when the acquirer is significantly larger than the 
target firm (Pablo, 1994). In such cases, target firm members’ needs tend to get overlooked or 
trivialized by the acquiring firm’s management (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). The impact of a power 
differential between the two organizations involved in an acquisition “is not simply the 
overwhelming and domination of the smaller entity through sheer magnitude, but also the 
intensification of beliefs about superiority and inferiority” (Pablo, 1994: 810). Acquiring 
executives tend to adopt an attitude of superiority and treat the members of the target firm as 
inferior, thereby resulting in status degradation and the voluntary departure of key employees 
(Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Lubatkin et al., 1999). The mere existence of a power differential 
may lead to suspicion through anticipation of dominance by acquiring executives. For example, 
it has been observed that the members of target firms altered their behavior in response to the 
threat of a powerful buyer even prior to being acquired, e.g., by seeking employment elsewhere 
(Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Krug & Nigh, 2001; Olie, 1990). Moreover, as power asymmetry 
increases, the weaker party often becomes distrustful because the more powerful firm has no 
need to be trusting and can use its relative power to obtain cooperation (Anderson & Weitz, 
1989). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the power differential, the lower the level of trust that target firm 
members have in the acquiring firm’s management. 
Relative performance. The impact of a corporate takeover on the acquired personnel’s morale 
and productivity is not always negative (Cartwright & Cooper, 1996). This is especially true 
when the members of the target firm see the acquiring company as a savior or having a more 
enlightened culture, or when they see a variety of positive outcomes in being associated with the 
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acquiring company (better pay, more prestige, etc.). For example, Bastien (1987) found that the 
overall mood of target employees was celebratory and optimistic after a “white knight” 
acquisition by a healthy buyer. Being liberated from weak and ineffective management may 
enhance employee satisfaction and commitment, and is likely to result in positive attitudes 
toward the acquiring firm’s management (Hunt, 1990; Schweiger, 2002). The foregoing 
discussion suggests that high performance of the acquirer relative to the target may have a 
positive effect on target firm members’ trust, in that the acquiring firm’s managers are perceived 
to be more competent, effective and supportive. 
Hypothesis 4: The better the pre-acquisition performance of the acquirer relative to that of 
the target, the higher the level of trust that target firm members have in the acquiring firm’s 
management.  
It is important to note that the above relationship is likely to be affected by target firm members’ 
hierarchical level in the organization. In this paper, we focus on non-managerial employees in 
the target firm. Since the poor performance of a company is commonly attributed to its top 
managers, the prospect of being acquired by a more successful company is likely to be 
threatening to the target firm’s executives, but less so to rank-and-file employees who may 
benefit from a takeover by a healthy buyer. 
Cultural similarity. The “cultural distance” hypothesis (Hofstede, 1980), in its most general 
form, suggests that the difficulties, costs, and risks associated with cross-cultural contact increase 
with growing cultural divergence between two individuals, groups, or organizations. Although 
studies that tested the cultural distance hypothesis in the context of M&A have yielded 
inconclusive results (see Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Stahl & Voigt, 2008 for reviews), 
research on intra- and interorganizational trust suggests that shared norms and cultural values 
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facilitate the development of trust and the emergence of a strong group identity, while limiting 
the potential for conflict (Kramer, 1999; Lewicki et al., 1998; Sarkar, Cavusgil & Evirgen, 
1997). Conversely, trust can erode and the potential for conflict increases when a person or 
group is perceived as not sharing key values and beliefs (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). As a result of 
basic cognitive processes such as social categorization, the members of the out-group are often 
evaluated as uniformly malevolent, incompetent, or ill-informed – and the in-group is viewed in 
the opposite terms (Kramer, 1999; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996). In cross-border M&A, feelings of 
hostility, resentment and distrust may be further fueled by cultural stereotypes and xenophobia, 
resulting in an exaggerated view of differences and a lack of attention to similarities (Vaara, 
2003). These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The greater the cultural similarity, the higher the level of trust that target 
firm members have in the acquiring firm’s management.  
In addition, we propose that five integration process variables affect target firm members’ trust 
in the acquiring firm’s management. Each is discussed below. 
Retained autonomy. Although, theoretically, integration can result in a balanced merging of 
two organizations, their cultures and workforces, this balance rarely occurs in practice. Instead, 
the acquirer – or, in the case of a merger, the more powerful partner – typically imposes control 
on the target firm and, where changes occur in policies, systems, and culture, they usually affect 
the target firm employees more strongly than those of the acquirer (Cartwright & Cooper, 1996; 
Pablo, 1994; Weber et al., 1996). Imposed control refers to a situation in which the acquirer 
removes autonomy from the target firm and imposes a rigorous or standardized set of rules, 
systems, and performance expectations upon it in order to gain quick control (Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986). Autonomy removal can be devastating from the perspective of the members of the target 
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firm and lead to feelings of helplessness and open hostility, as managers and employees 
vigorously defend their autonomy (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993) – a situation that Datta and 
Grant (1990) have termed the “conquering army syndrome.” Moreover, because tight controls 
tend to signal the absence of trust, their use typically hampers its emergence in 
interorganizational relationships, often resulting in a cycle of escalating distrust and conflict 
(Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6: The greater the extent of retained autonomy, the higher the level of trust that 
target firm members have in the acquiring firm’s management.  
Integration speed. In the M&A literature, there is considerable disagreement about the nature of 
the relationship between speed of integration and post-acquisition integration outcomes. While 
some authors (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) have cited the tendency to consummate deals too 
hastily as a major contributor to the high failure rate of M&A, others (e.g., Buono & Bowditch, 
1989) have suggested that a window of opportunity exists during the short time after an 
acquisition when the organization is “unfrozen” and employees expect change and are thus 
malleable to new ways of doing things. Others have suggested that the optimal speed of 
integration depends on a number of contingencies, such as the strategic intent behind the 
acquisition and the integration approach taken (Evans et al., 2002; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
Despite these complexities, there seems to be agreement that, although a high speed of 
integration is associated with greater stress, hesitation in approaching integration and telling 
employees that little will change is likely to create the impression of incapable management and 
generate suspicion, because employees expect significant change following a takeover (Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989; Stahl & Sitkin, 2005). As Mitchell (1989: 44) has noted, “if the acquirer does 
not act quickly to harness the expectations of the target firm and take advantage of the new 
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loyalties, the chances are these expectations and loyalties will rapidly disappear into a miasma of 
disillusionment and mistrust.” Therefore, we propose the following hypothsesis: 
Hypothesis 7: The greater the speed of integration, the higher the level of trust that target 
firm members have in the acquiring firm’s management.  
Cultural tolerance and sensitivity. The impact of a takeover on target firm members’ morale is 
likely to depend on the acquirer’s multiculturalism and cultural sensitivity. The term 
multiculturalism refers to the degree to which an organization values cultural diversity and is 
willing to tolerate and encourage it (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). A multicultural acquirer 
considers diversity an asset, and is therefore likely to allow an acquired firm to retain its own 
values and practices (Pablo, 1994). By contrast, a unicultural acquirer emphasizes conformity 
and adherence to a unique organizational ideology, and is therefore more likely to impose its 
culture on the target firm. Cultural intolerance may increase an acquirer’s tendency to 
overemphasize cultural differences and result in an attitude polarization toward distrust (Sitkin & 
Stickel, 1996). A variable that is closely related to cultural tolerance is cultural sensitivity. 
Research on alliances suggests that cultural sensitivity, defined as a firm’s capability to deal 
sympathetically with cultural differences, enhances the partner’s trust and increases the 
likelihood of successful strategic integration (Johnson et al., 1997). In acquisitions, a lack of 
cultural sensibility on the part of the acquirer can lead to feelings of resentment, hostility and 
distrust on the part of the target firm employees (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 8: The greater the acquirer’s cultural tolerance and sensitivity, the higher the 
level of trust that target firm members have in the acquiring firm’s management. 
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Reward and job security enhancement. There is evidence to suggest that the way employees 
react to an acquisition depends to a large extent on the personal benefits and losses attributed to 
the takeover. If, for example, the members of a target firm see the takeover as a chance for 
greater job security and increased prospects for compensation and promotion, this is likely to 
affect their attitudes toward the acquirer in a positive way, and reduce the potential for conflict 
(Larsson, 1990; Schweiger, 2002). Cisco, for instance, buys companies for their technology and 
R&D talent and then assimilates them into the Cisco culture, but it attempts to retain most of the 
employees, including top management, and provides strong financial incentives, excellent career 
opportunities, and promotes a vision of the merged entity that includes an important role for the 
acquired employees. Such recognition and incentives help to build trust and encourage acquired 
employees to stay (Chaudhuri, 2005). The strategic alliance literature also addresses this issue. 
Research has shown that the perceived benefits derived from an alliance have a positive effect on 
the mutual trust and commitment of the parties involved (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Sarkar et al., 
1997). Collectively, these arguments suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 9: The greater the post-acquisition reward and job security enhancement, the 
higher the level of trust that target firm members have in the acquiring firm’s management. 
Communication quality. Providing acquired employees with credible and relevant information 
has been shown to reduce the uncertainty associated with corporate takeovers and to mitigate 
their negative effects on employee morale and productivity (Bastien, 1987; Schweiger & DeNisi, 
1991). A lack of credible and open communication, on the other hand, has been found to 
adversely affect employee commitment and trust in the aftermath of M&A (Buono & Bowditch, 
1989). However, while the credibility of the information provided by the acquiring firm’s 
management can be considered a sine qua non for trust to emerge, Hogan and Overmyer-Day 
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(1994) found that too much information disseminated to employees in acquisitions characterized 
by high levels of integration can exacerbate undesirable attitudes and behaviors, because it 
increases anxiety in a situation where employees already feel uncertain about their jobs. These 
findings suggest that the quality and timing of communication may be more important than the 
amount of information provided by the acquirer. Failure to share critical information with the 
members of the target firm in a timely manner may generate suspicion and mistrust. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 10: The more credible, timely, and relevant the information provided by the 
acquirer, the higher the level of trust that target firm members have in the acquiring firm’s 
management. 
Effects of Trust on Post-Acquisition Performance and Integration Outcomes 
Figure 1 proposes that the degree to which the target firm members trust the acquiring firm’s 
management is likely to affect a variety of attitudinal, behavioral, and performance outcomes. 
Next, we discuss the consequences of trust for sociocultural integration and synergy realization. 
Sociocultural integration outcomes. Sociocultural integration, defined as the combination of 
groups of people with a shared identity, compatible values, and positive attitudes toward the new 
organization (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Shrivastava, 1986), represents an important dimension of 
acquisition success from an organizational and human resources perspective. Consistent with the 
definition of trust adopted in this study, sociocultural integration outcomes such as employee 
commitment, willingness to cooperate, and intent to stay imply some form of risk taking and a 
willingness to be vulnerable on the part of the target firm members – and thus require trust. 
Likewise, the negative reactions and outcomes that have been observed in the aftermath of 
M&A, such as employee resistance, political in-fighting, and turnover (Buono & Bowditch, 
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1989; Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Vaara, 2003), may reflect an unwillingness on the part of the 
target firm members to be vulnerable and engage in behaviors that put them at risk. This is in 
line with two meta-analyses of the role of trust in organizational settings (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001, 
2002), which suggest that trust affects a variety of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes at the 
individual level. This leads us to the following prediction: 
Hypothesis 11: The degree to which the target firm members trust the acquiring firm’s 
management is positively associated with attitudinal and behavioral outcomes, such as 
target firm members’ commitment, satisfaction, acceptance of change, willingness to 
cooperate, open communication, and intent to stay. 
Post-acquisition performance. We propose that the degree to which target firm members trust 
the acquiring firm’s management will not only affect the process of sociocultural integration, but 
will also influence the post-acquisition performance. A growing body of research (e.g., 
Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001) has shown 
that the execution of a well-designed integration process that minimizes interorganizational, 
interpersonal and intercultural friction is essential to capturing anticipated synergies in 
acquisitions. For example, Birkinshaw, Bresman and Håkanson (2000), in a study of foreign 
acquisitions made by Swedish multinationals, found that mutual respect and trust made the post-
acquisition capability transfer and resource sharing easier; successful efforts to transfer 
knowledge and capabilities, in turn, facilitated the development of a shared identity and trust. 
These findings suggest that poor sociocultural integration limits the effectiveness of task 
integration efforts, because the individuals on both sides do not trust one another and are 
unwilling to collaborate. Lack of trust can thus undermine the realization of synergies in two 
ways: first, through its adverse effect on sociocultural integration outcomes, such as the quality 
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of communication and collaboration between the members of the combining organizations; and 
second, by undermining the transfer of capabilities, resource sharing, and learning in the 
aftermath of a takeover. Collectively, these arguments support the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 12: The degree to which target firm members trust the acquiring firm’s 
management is positively associated with realized synergies.  
Trust as a Mediating Variable in the Post-Acquisition Integration Process 
Trust theorists and researchers have modeled trust as an independent variable, a dependent 
variable, or a moderating condition for a causal relationship (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). As Rousseau 
et al. (1998) have noted, when performance outcomes are of interest, researchers often 
conceptualize trust as a potential cause (e.g., high levels of trust lead to superior team 
performance). Conversely, trust can be conceptualized as an effect (e.g., the result of team 
building interventions). In this study, we model trust both as a cause and an effect. That is, we 
conceptualize trust as a mediating variable in the relationship between the hypothesized trust 
antecedents and post-acquisition outcomes. Specifically, we propose that aspects of the acquirer-
target relationship (e.g., performance differences), as well as aspects of the acquirer’s integration 
approach (e.g., autonomy removal) affect sociocultural integration outcomes and synergy 
realization by undermining or enhancing target firm members’ trust in the acquiring firm’s 
management. This leads to our final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 13: Target firm members’ trust in the acquiring firm’s management mediates 
the relationships between the hypothesized trust antecedents and integration outcomes. 
METHOD 
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The hypotheses were tested using the case survey method. Case surveys represent a particular 
type of integrative research review (cf. Cooper, 1984; Yin & Heald, 1975). They involve the 
quantification of a group of case studies for statistical analysis (Bullock & Tubbs, 1987; Jauch, 
Osborn & Martin, 1980). The basic procedure is to (1) select a set of case studies relevant to the 
research question, (2) develop a coding scheme for systematic conversion of the qualitative case 
descriptions into quantified variables, (3) use multiple raters to code the cases and measure 
interrater reliability, and (4) statistically analyze the coded data (Larsson, 1993). 
The usefulness of the case survey method for investigating complex organizational processes has 
been firmly established by prior research (e.g., Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Miller & Friesen, 
1980). Studies suggest that the case survey method is an economical, yet powerful method in 
research fields where case studies dominate. It allows capturing a broad range of conditions and 
identifying and testing patterns in situations where an experimental design is not possible and a 
large-scale survey design would be impractical. The major strength of the method is that it 
permits in-depth analysis of rich and detailed case descriptions while providing large amounts of 
data to allow statistical testing and generalization of findings. These strengths make the case 
survey method particularly well-suited for the study of trust in acquisitions. M&A case studies 
provide rich longitudinal process descriptions that allow coding of the social, cultural, and 
human resources issues involved in M&A (Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001). 
The validity of the case survey method is constrained by the quantity and especially the quality 
of available case studies, as well as non-random collection of case studies and simplification of 
cases in the coding process. However, there are several ways to address these validity concerns. 
These include analysis of the effects of case study design characteristics on case survey results, 
and participation of the case authors in the coding process and validation of case codings 
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(Larsson, 1993). Possible sampling biases can also be tested and, if needed, controlled through 
stratified sampling (Lucas, 1974). 
Sample 
Case study search. To prevent sample bias and guarantee large coverage, the case search 
involved computerized and manual searches of published and unpublished cases. Computerized 
searches were performed on the following databases: ABI/INFORM, Business Source Premier, 
Proquest, EconLit, PsychInfo, and Dissertation Abstracts Online. Other search strategies 
included the screening of bibliographies and case catalogues, internet search using standard 
search engines, and manual searches in relevant books and journals. More than 150 cases were 
identified through this process. The cases were then screened for completeness and relevance. 
Selection criteria. For a case study to be included, it had to fulfill the following criteria: (1) 
Only real-life cases qualified for inclusion in the case survey; fictional cases or cases that 
contained fictional elements, as they are sometimes used for educational purposes, were 
excluded. (2) Only cases covering the post-acquisition integration period were selected; cases 
that focused on the pre-acquisition phase or the time of the legal combination were excluded. (3) 
Since the purpose of this study was to examine the role that trust plays in acquisitions, only cases 
that addressed issues related to trust (e.g., descriptions of how the acquirer’s integration 
decisions generated suspicion and mistrust) were included; cases dealing solely with financial or 
strategic issues were excluded. (4) Since the model tested in this study is applicable only to 
M&A in which the pattern of power is asymmetrical, cases of “mergers of equals” did not 
qualify for inclusion in the case survey. However, a closer inspection of the case studies 
indicated that all mergers described in the cases (including those termed “mergers of equals”) 
showed clear signs of power asymmetry; hence, all cases were included. 
 18 
 
 
Sample characteristics. A total of 50 cases meeting the eligibility criteria were identified 
through this process. The final sample comprised both domestic and cross-border acquisitions in 
a variety of industries that had been completed over a 30 year period. Twenty cases involved US 
acquirers, 25 cases European acquirers, two cases Asian acquirers, and in three cases the 
nationality of the acquirer was unclear. The Appendix provides a synopsis of the cases.  
Coding and Inter-Rater Agreement  
The coding of cases was conducted in accordance with guidelines provided by Larsson (1990; 
1993). Many of the items were adopted from coding schemes used by Larsson in earlier case 
surveys of M&A (e.g., Larsson, 1990; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001). 
In addition, several new items were designed to measure variables suggested by the theoretical 
model (e.g., trust). Most variables were measured by using 5-point scales to maximize the 
amount of information captured through coding, with interrater reliability serving as a quality 
constraint. Items that could not be coded reliably on a 5-point scale were subsequently collapsed 
to fewer points until acceptable reliability was obtained. For each variable, the underlying 
theoretical concept was explained in the coding scheme and indicators were listed to facilitate the 
coding process.  
All cases were coded by at least two, sometimes three, independent raters: one of the authors, a 
post-graduate student who was unaware of the hypotheses, and, in some cases, the case author. 
The interrater reliability coefficient used for metric variables was the Intraclass Correlation 
Coefficient (ICC) (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). ICCs above .70 can be considered satisfactory and 
those above .80 good. ICCs obtained in this study ranged from .37 to .96. With one exception, 
where the ICC was .69, variables with an ICC below .70 were excluded from the analyses. The 
interrater reliability coefficient used for variables measured on a nominal scale was Cohen’s 
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kappa. As a rule of thumb, kappas above .80 can be considered good (Neuendorf, 2002). Kappas 
for the nominal variables measured in this study ranged from .76 to 1.00.  
Measures and Properties 
Given the dynamic nature of trust in M&A, multiple measurement points were used to capture 
the evolution of trust over time. Figure 2 illustrates the temporal division of the post-acquisition 
integration period, starting at the time of the legal combination (t1) and ending with the end of 
the case description (t3), when the acquired company was either successfully integrated or 
integration had failed (often resulting in divestment). The point in time that divides the 
integration period into two halves was defined as t2. Variables that could be expected to change 
over time were measured at several points in time. All trust indicators were measured at t1, t2 
and t3. Variables related to the acquirer-target relationship at the time of takeover (e.g., 
collaboration history) required only a single measurement at t1. Integration process variables 
(e.g., integration speed) were measured during periods t1-t2 and t2-t3. Post-acquisition 
integration outcomes (e.g., employee commitment) were measured at t2 and t3. This design 
made it possible to study the evolution of trust over time and to examine the effects of the 
hypothesized trust antecedents at different stages of the integration process. It also made it 
possible to detect time lags between the acquirer’s integration decisions and actions, and the 
manifestation of sociocultural integration outcomes. 
_________________ 
 Insert Figure 2 here 
_________________ 
 
Trust. Target firm members’ trust was conceptualized as the perceived trustworthiness of the 
acquiring firm’s management in terms of five attributes (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; 
Mishra, 1996): Ability (ICC = .88 at t1, ICC = .94 at t2, ICC = .86 at t3), Integrity (ICC = .71 at 
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t1, ICC = .94 at t2, ICC = .94 at t3), Benevolence (ICC = .73 at t1, ICC = .84 at t2, ICC = .83 at 
t3), Openness (ICC = .52 at t1, ICC = .58 at t2, ICC = .42 at t3) and Value Congruence (ICC = 
.83 at t1, ICC = .70 at t2, ICC = .88 at t3). Hence, the Openness measure had to be eliminated 
due to unreliability. In addition, an item measuring Overall Trust was included (ICC = .76 at t1, 
ICC = .79 at t2, ICC = .91 at t3). To test whether the various bases of trust combine to determine 
overall trust (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995), multiple regression analyses were conducted, 
with Overall Trust as the dependent variable. After controlling for research design characteristics 
(see below), the four trust indicators explained large amounts of variance in Overall Trust at t1 
(R2 = .57, n = 25, p < .01), t2 (R2 = .78, n = 27, p < .01), and t3 (R2 = .84, n = 24, p < .01). 
Therefore, the ability, integrity, benevolence and value congruence measures were combined to 
form composite trust scales, Trust t1 ( = .86), Trust t2 ( = .91) and Trust t3 ( = .92). 
Status variables. Single items were used to measure three aspects of the acquirer-target 
relationship, namely Takeover Friendliness (ICC = .37), Power Differential (ICC = .75), and 
Relative Firm Performance (ICC = .87). The Takeover Friendliness measure was excluded from 
subsequent analyses due to unreliability. Two items measured different aspects of cultural 
similarity, namely Shared Meanings (ICC = .69) and Management Style Similarity (ICC = .78). 
The ratings were averaged to form a composite scale, Cultural Similarity. No Cronbach’s alpha 
was calculated, as the two indicators represent different dimensions of the underlying construct. 
Two items measured different aspects of collaboration history, namely Relationship Quality 
(ICC = .63) and Length of Relationship (ICC = .92). Since the Relationship Quality measure had 
to be eliminated due to unreliability, only one aspect of collaboration history, Length of 
Relationship, was included in subsequent analyses. 
 21 
 
 
Integration process variables. Single items were used to measure three integration process 
variables at different points in time, namely Integration Speed (ICC = .79 for t1-2, ICC = .86 for 
t2-3), Cultural Tolerance and Sensitivity (ICC = .88 for t1-2, ICC = .88 for t2-3), and 
Communication Quality (ICC = .64 for t1-2, ICC = .79 for t2-3). The Communication Quality 
measure for the time period t1-2 had to be eliminated due to unreliability. Three items measured 
different aspects of retained autonomy, namely Asymmetric Operational Control (ICC = .84), 
Broken Integrity (ICC = .77), and Force Against Will (ICC = .90). Ratings were inverted and 
combined to form a new scale, Retained Autonomy. No Cronbach’s alpha was calculated, as the 
three variables represent different facets of autonomy that can vary independently of one another. 
Two items were used to measure reward and job security enhancement, namely Reward Change 
(ICC = .91) and Job Security Change (ICC = .86). Ratings were averaged to form a new scale, 
Reward and Job Security Enhancement. No Cronbach’s alpha was calculated, as job security and 
compensation and rewards represent different aspects of an acquirer’s HR policies and practices. 
Sociocultural integration outcomes. Single items were used to measure the following 
attitudinal and behavioral outcomes: Satisfaction (ICC = .75 at t2, ICC = .89 at t3), Commitment 
(ICC = .48 at t2, ICC = .87 at t3), Acceptance of Change (ICC = .49 at t2, ICC = .89 at t3), 
Intention to Stay (ICC = .49 at t2, ICC = .81 at t3), Willingness to Cooperate (ICC = .83 at t2, 
ICC = .84 at t3), Job Performance (ICC = .90 at t2, ICC = .90 at t3), and Open Communication 
(ICC = .78 at t2, ICC = .78 at t3). Some of these measures had reliabilities below .70 and had to 
be excluded from further analyses. Since employees may enter a takeover situation with differing 
“baselines” of attitudes and behaviors, changes in attitudes and behaviors over time rather than 
absolute levels were measured by comparing pre-acquisition with post-acquisition levels. 
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Synergy realization. Since few case studies contain detailed information on realized synergies 
(e.g., in terms of transfers of capabilities and resource sharing), two accounting-based measures, 
Sales Growth (ICC = .93 at t2, ICC = .89 at t3) and Realized Profit (ICC = .91 at t2, ICC = .92 at 
t3), were used to measure post-acquisition performance. The use of accounting-based measures 
as a proxy for synergy realization is widely considered appropriate in M&A performance 
research, because “[t]he realization of synergies should be reflected in accounting-based 
performance improvements” (Harrison et al., 1991: 181). 
Controls. The following control variables were included to test whether research design and 
sample characteristics affected the results: Comprehensiveness of Data Collection (e.g., number 
of persons interviewed); Use of Multiple Methods (e.g., number of different data collection 
methods used); Validation (whether systematic attempts were made to validate the case study 
findings); Length of Integration Period (in months); Publication Status (published vs 
unpublished); Anonymity (whether the identities of the firms were disguised); Author 
Participation (whether the author was involved in the coding). Interrater reliabilities for the 
control variables were satisfactory to very good, with ICCs and Kappas ranging from .71 to 1.00. 
Validity of case coding 
The use of control variables helped to identify possible sampling biases by testing for the effects 
of different case sources and designs (Larsson, 1993). The results of bivariate correlations show 
very limited and scattered effects, suggesting little systematic influence of case study design 
characteristics. Out of a total of 145 correlation coefficients between control variables and study 
variables, only eight (5%) were significant. Of these, six were correlations with the control 
variable, Length of Integration Period. The almost complete lack of significant correlations with 
other control variables supports the validity of the codings as not being systematically biased. 
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The participation of case authors allowed analysis of whether cases that were coded based on 
secondary data differed systematically from cases that were coded based on the case authors’ 
primary data (Larsson, 1993; Lucas, 1974). None of the correlations with the Author 
Participation dummy variable were significant, suggesting very little, if any, systematic 
differences and thereby supporting the validity of the codings. 
Thirteen of the 50 cases were drawn from the Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) M&A case sample 
and 19 of the originally coded variables were re-used in this study. In Larsson and Finkelstein’s 
(1999) study, the validity of the case data had been tested against various external, independent 
data on M&A performance, relatedness, combination type, organizational integration, and 
employee resistance that all consistently supported the validity of the coded case sample. We 
tested for any systematic differences between the codings used by Larsson and Finkelstein 
(1999) and those obtained in the present study through the use of a dummy variable and found no 
significant differences. We also tested the sensitivity of our findings to the inclusion of the 
externally validated cases by redoing the correlational analysis for the sub-sample of cases that 
had not been externally validated, and found the same correlational patterns with only a few 
minor variations in levels of significance. Thus, the inclusion of the case data used by Larsson 
and Finkelstein (1999) added externally validated case codings that represented about 25% of the 
total case sample without significantly biasing the results. Overall, the available evidence 
suggests that the case data are valid representations of the M&A cases that were studied. 
RESULTS 
Zero-Order Correlations 
The means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlation coefficients of all variables are 
presented in Table 1. As indicated by the correlation matrix, trust levels at the three measurement 
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points were positively and significantly intercorrelated and increased over time. The difference 
between the beginning and the end of the integration period is statistically significant (t = 2.7, n 
= 46, p <.01). A similar development over time can be observed for most of the sociocultural 
integration outcomes and performance measures. Where measures exist for two measurement 
points, a positive development over time can be observed. Significant mean differences were 
found for Satisfaction (t = 2.63, n = 36, p < .05), Willingness to Cooperate (t = 4.15, n = 47, p < 
.01), Job Performance (t = 2.66, n = 31, p < .05), Communication (t = 2.80, n = 32, p < .01), and 
Sales Growth (t = 2.48, n = 30, p < .05). These findings suggest that human resources related 
problems are more prevalent at an early stage of the integration period than at later stages. 
_________________ 
Insert Table 1 here 
_________________ 
 
Moreover, the correlation matrix indicates that all sociocultural integration outcomes are 
significantly and positively intercorrelated. This is not only the case for measurements at the 
same point in time but also for measurements at different points of the post-acquisition 
integration period. Similarly, the two organizational performance measures examined (Sales 
Growth and Realized Profit) are positively and significantly correlated at both measurement 
points. While Realized Profit is significantly and positively correlated with most of the 
sociocultural integration outcomes examined, Sales Growth shows positive but weaker and only 
partly significant correlations with attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. 
Hypotheses Tests 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the relationships between the hypothesized trust 
antecedents and trust (Hypotheses 1-10). In all regression analyses, the control variables were 
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entered before the predictor variable of interest; the increase in variance explained by the 
predictor was then used as an estimate of the predictor’s relative importance in influencing trust. 
Hypotheses 1 to 5 propose that variables related to the acquirer-target relationship affect target 
firm members’ trust in the acquiring firm’s management. Table 2 shows how much variance in 
trust is explained by each of the predictor variables at different times of the integration period. 
The first variable hypothesized to affect trust, Collaboration History, accounts for non-significant 
amounts of variance in trust at all three measurement points, suggesting that the length of the 
relationship between the acquirer and the target does not influence target firm members’ trust. 
Thus, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Hypothesis 2 could not be tested due to poor interrater 
reliability of the Takeover Friendliness measure. The amount of variance in trust explained by 
Power Differential is non-significant at all measurement points and the standardized regression 
coefficients are opposite to the hypothesized direction. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Relative Performance accounts for non-significant amounts of variance in trust at different points 
of the integration period. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. The amount of variance in trust 
explained by Cultural Similarity is non-significant at the beginning and around the middle of the 
integration period but is significant at the end of the integration period. The standardized 
regression coefficient is in the expected direction, providing partial support for Hypothesis 5. 
_________________ 
Insert Table 2 here 
_________________ 
 
Hypotheses 6 to 10 propose that several integration process variables affect target firm members’ 
trust. Trust levels measured at t2 were regressed on integration process variables measured 
during the first half of the integration period, while trust levels measured at t3 were regressed on 
process variables measured during the second half. As indicated by Table 2, the amount of 
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variance in trust explained by Retained Autonomy is non-significant. Thus, Hypothesis 6 is not 
supported. The amount of variance explained by Integration Speed is non-significant for the first 
half of the integration period but is significant for the second half. The regression coefficient is 
in the expected direction, suggesting that high integration speed is associated with higher levels 
of trust. Thus, Hypothesis 7 is partly supported. The amount of variance explained by Cultural 
Tolerance and Sensitivity is significant for both measurement periods and the regression 
coefficients are in the predicted direction, suggesting that cultural tolerance and sensitivity on the 
part of the acquirer are positively associated with trust. Thus, Hypothesis 8 is supported. Reward 
and Job Security Enhancement, measured over the entire integration period, accounts for a 
significant amount of variance in trust. The regression coefficient is in the predicted direction, 
supporting Hypothesis 9. Hypothesis 10 could only be tested for the second half of the 
integration period due to poor reliability of the Communication Quality measure for the first half. 
The amount of variance in trust explained by Communication Quality is significant, suggesting 
that credible, timely, and relevant information provided by the acquirer management is positively 
associated with target firm members’ trust. 
Hypotheses 11 and 12 propose that target firm members’ trust will affect a variety of attitudinal, 
behavioral and performance outcomes. Table 3 shows how much of the variance in each 
outcome variable is explained by trust levels at different points of the integration period after 
controls are entered. Sociocultural integration outcomes were regressed on trust levels measured 
at the same point in time, based on the assumption that trust (or lack of trust) affects attitudinal 
and behavioral outcomes instantly. Post-acquisition performance measures were regressed on 
trust levels measured earlier in the integration period (e.g., sales growth from t2 to t3 was 
regressed on trust at t2), based on the assumption that a time lag exists between trust inducing (or 
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reducing) events and possible performance effects at the firm level. Table 3 indicates that trust, 
measured around the middle and at the end of the integration period, accounts for a significant 
amount of variance in several integration outcomes. Trust is a significant predictor of target firm 
members’ satisfaction, job performance, willingness to cooperate, and open communication 
around the middle of the integration period. In addition, trust is significantly and positively 
associated with all sociocultural integration outcomes measured at the end of the integration 
period. Thus, Hypothesis 11 is supported. As indicated by Table 3, trust does not seem to affect 
sales growth, but is positively associated with realized profits at later stages of the post-
acquisition integration period. Thus, Hypothesis 12 is partly supported. 
_________________ 
Insert Table 3 here 
_________________ 
 
To test whether trust acts as a mediating variable, we adopted Baron and Kenny’s (1986) four-
step approach to assessing mediating effects. According to Baron and Kenny, mediation exists if 
the following four conditions are met: (1) The predictors are significantly related to the potential 
mediator; (2) the potential mediator is significantly related to the criteria; (3) the predictors are 
significantly related to the criteria; (4) the variance in the criteria explained by the predictors is 
substantially reduced when the potential mediator is controlled. As has already been shown, 
condition 1 is met for five trust antecedents, namely cultural similarity, integration speed, 
cultural tolerance and sensitivity, reward and job security enhancement, and communication 
quality (see Table 2). The results further indicate that condition 2 is met for all sociocultural 
integration outcome variables and realized profit (see Table 3).  
Table 4 reveals whether the remaining two conditions for mediation are met. Only those 
predictors and outcome variables that are significantly related to trust (i.e., for which conditions 
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1 and 2 are met) are included. As indicated by Table 4, the five predictors explain significant 
amounts of variance in several integration outcomes, thus satisfying condition 3. Moreover, the 
results show that after entering trust as a control, the amount of variance in integration outcomes 
explained by the predictor variables is substantially reduced in most cases, which implies that 
condition 4 is met for most of the relationships. Collectively, these findings suggest that trust 
mediates the effects of some of the trust antecedents on sociocultural integration outcomes. 
Variables such as cultural similarity, integration speed, reward and job security enhancement, 
communication quality, and the cultural tolerance and sensitivity exhibited by the acquirer thus 
seem to affect target firm members’ attitudes and behaviors largely through perceptions of the 
acquiring firm managers’ trustworthiness. Interestingly, the effects of cultural similarity and two 
of the integration process variables – reward and job security enhancement, and communication 
quality – on realized profits also seem to be partly mediated by trust. These findings support the 
conclusion that the way in which an acquiring firm approaches the integration process may affect 
a variety of behavioral, attitudinal and performance outcomes by undermining or enhancing 
target firm members’ trust. 
     _________________ 
     Insert Table 4 here 
     _________________ 
DISCUSSION 
Despite a large body of anecdotal evidence supporting the critical role that trust plays in M&A, 
little is known about the factors that influence the development of trust in acquired organizations 
and the effects of that trust on post-acquisition outcomes. We set out to develop a model that 
synthesizes our current understanding of the factors that influence the post-acquisition 
integration process, with target firm members’ trust in the acquiring firm’s management as a key 
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mediating variable, and tested it using the case survey method. We found that while aspects of 
the acquirer-target relationship were poor predictors of trust, integration process variables such 
as the quality of communication, the cultural tolerance and sensitivity exhibited by acquiring 
managers, and the quality of post-acquisition reward and job security changes were major factors 
influencing target firm members’ trust. Given that trust requires a willingness to rely on and be 
vulnerable to another party under a condition of risk (Mayer et al., 1995), it seems intuitively 
plausible that aspects of the integration approach and management practices adopted by the 
acquirer are more closely associated with the emergence of trust than characteristics of the initial 
takeover situation. These management-related factors not only have a major impact on acquired 
personnel’s lives and careers, they also reveal much about the acquiring executives’ competence, 
integrity, and concern – and, thus, their trustworthiness.  
While trust has been found to be a significant predictor of employee attitudes and behaviors in 
previous research on the role of trust in organizational settings, empirical evidence for the impact 
of trust on firm performance is mixed (see Dirks & Ferrin, 2001 for a meta-analysis). The case 
survey findings suggest that in corporate acquisitions, not only does trust have a powerful effect 
on target firm members’ attitudes and behaviors, it may also contribute to the realization of 
synergies. This is consistent with recent research on M&A (e.g., Birkinshaw, Bresman & 
Håkanson, 2000; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001) that suggests that aspects of sociocultural 
integration, such as building an atmosphere of mutual respect and trust, facilitate the transfer of 
capabilities, resource sharing and learning; and that, conversely, sociocultural and human 
resources problems can undermine the realization of projected synergies. Future research – and 
management practice as well – would benefit from a closer examination of how aspects of the 
 30 
 
 
sociocultural integration process, such as the emergence of a shared identity and trust, affect the 
performance of firms involved in M&A activity. 
One of the key findings of this study is that trust mediates the effects of the acquirer’s integration 
approach and management practices on post-acquisition integration outcomes. Using a mediated 
regression procedure (Baron & Kenny, 1986), we found that factors such as the cultural 
sensitivity exhibited by the acquiring managers and the extent to which the information provided 
by the acquirer is credible, timely and relevant affect target firm members’ attitudes and 
behaviors through perceptions of the acquiring executives’ trustworthiness. Interestingly, these 
integration process variables also seem to affect the realization of synergies, and this effect is 
mediated through trust. Collectively, the findings support a “process perspective” on acquisitions 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), which suggests that the extent to which synergies are realized 
depends on the ability of the acquirer to manage the integration process effectively. While 
factors such as strategic and organizational fit may determine the potential for synergies, the 
integration approach and management practices adopted by the acquirer affect the extent to 
which that potential is realized. 
The case survey findings presented in this paper provided some new insights into the role that 
trust plays in the post-acquisition integration process. However, there are several possible 
limitations, as well as avenues for future research. Perhaps the most critical question is related to 
the appropriateness of the case survey methodology for studying the trust dynamics in M&A. 
The usefulness of the case survey method for investigating complex organizational processes has 
been established by prior research (e.g., Bullock & Lawler, 1985; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; 
Miller & Friesen, 1980). Following Bullock and Tubbs (1987), we used a variety of case sources 
and search strategies to reduce possible sample biases. We also tested for possible sampling 
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biases due to different case sources and study designs using several control variables and found 
not systematic differences. A key component of the validity analysis was the participation of 
case authors, which allowed us to test whether case codings made on the basis of the available 
case material were comparable to those made by the case authors on the basis of primary data. 
We also contrasted the case survey findings with those of a subsample of cases, which Larsson 
and Finkelstein (1999) had validated using primary and archival data independent of the case 
studies. All these analyses consistently supported the validity of our findings. 
There are possible concerns that can be raised regarding the external validity of the findings. The 
case sample is small by traditional survey standards and it has not been randomly drawn from the 
overall M&A population. This suggests the need for cautious interpretation of the case survey 
findings. However, it is the variety of case sources, designs, and authors that provide much of the 
strength of the case survey method in terms of the generalizability of results, which goes beyond 
that of single qualitative case studies or smaller multi-case studies. The fact that the case sample 
consisted of 50 case studies, conducted by different researchers with different research 
approaches and designs, made this study a stronger test than would have been possible had we 
conducted several in-depth case studies. Future M&A research using this methodology should 
try to increase the number of M&A cases studied to allow for comparisons across industries, 
nations and other contexts. This requires the creation of larger M&A case databases. 
CONCLUSION 
The case survey findings presented in this paper confirm what managers and employees involved 
in M&As intuitively understand, namely that trust plays a key role in the integration process. 
They also point to the important role of the acquiring firm’s integration approach in building 
trust and contributing to the success of the post-acquisition integration. This paper delineated a 
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number of actions that can be taken by the acquiring firm’s managers in order to prevent the 
occurrence of distrust and secure commitment and cooperation from acquired employees. 
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Figure 1 
Model of the Antecedents and Consequences of Trust in Acquisitions Tested in this Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sociocultural Integration 
Outcomes 
 Satisfaction 
 Commitment 
 Acceptance of change 
 Intention to stay 
 Job performance 
 Willingness to cooperate 
 Two-way communication 
      Synergy Realization 
 Sales growth 
 Realized profit  
Target Firm  
Members’ Trust  
in Acquiring Firm’s 
Management      Integration Approach 
 Retained autonomy 
 Integration speed 
 Cultural tolerance and 
sensitivity 
 Job security and reward 
enhancement 
 Communication quality 
  Acquirer-Target Relationship 
 Collaboration history  
 Takeover mode 
 Power differential 
 Relative performance 
 Cultural similarity 
     Note: Solid arrows indicate relationships tested in this study; dotted arrows indicate proposed  
     relationships that could not be tested directly.  
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Figure 2 
Temporal Division of Post-Acquisition Integration Period (adopted from Larsson, 1990) 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among Variables 
  n M sd  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. Trust t1 48 2.59 1.12  1.00                
2. Trust t2 48 2.78 1.15  .42
**
 1.00               
3. Trust t3 48 3.05 1.17  .31
*
 .86
**
 1.00              
4. Power Differential 50 3.49 1.23  .23 .11 .16 1.00             
5. Relative Performance 42 2.51 1.48  -.33
*
 -.22 -.15 -.12 1.00            
6. Cultural Similarity 48 1.49 .56  -.01 .35
*
 .30 .14 -.09 1.00           
7. Collaboration History 44 2.65 1.43  -.22 .04 .18 -.36
*
 .16 -.19 1.00          
8. Retained Autonomy 50 3.02 1.03  .09 .20 .17 -.38
**
 -.14 -.20 .27 1.00         
9. Integration Speed (t1-t2) 34 3.18 1.45  .16 .25 .30 .13 -.32 .30 -.28 .06 1.00        
10. Integration Speed (t2-t3) 34 3.43 1.40  .15 .41
*
 .41
*
 .38
*
 -.20 .38
*
 -.29 -.16 .83
**
 1.00       
11. Cultural Tolerance (t1-t2) 47 2.96 1.19  .24 .48
**
 .32
*
 -.40
**
 .06 .13 .09 .57
**
 .06 -.09 1.00      
12. Cultural Tolerance (t2-t3) 47 2.90 1.16  .21 .42
**
 .45
**
 -.38
**
 -.17 .16 .12 .66
**
 .20 -.06 .83
**
 1.00     
13. Reward Enhancement 45 2.56 .71  -.02 .51
**
 .48
**
 -.07 -.19 .16 .27 .33 -.13 -.12 .34
*
 .34
*
 1.00    
14. Communication Quality (t2-t3) 44 3.17 1.29  .15 .73
**
 .80
**
 .06 -.25 .13 .02 .35
*
 .57
**
 .56
**
 .42
**
 .47
**
 .41
**
 1.00   
15. Job Satisfaction t2 37 2.41 1.04  .10 .50
**
 .53
**
 .03 -.32 .30 .04 .23 .33 .30 .22 .29 .58
**
 .52
**
 1.00  
16. Job Satisfaction t3 38 2.83 1.19  .07 .51
**
 .79
**
 .29 -.26 .30 .32 .08 .28 .32 .07 .31 .42
*
 .61
**
 .76
**
 1.00 
17. Commitment t3 48 2.57 1.03  .16 .69
**
 .83
**
 .26 -.29 .28 .04 .12 .44
*
 .41
*
 .28 .40
**
 .55
**
 .75
**
 .66
**
 .84
**
 
18. Acceptance of Change t3 46 3.27 1.31  .16 .67
**
 .87
**
 .21 -.12 .29 .17 .12 .49
**
 .50
**
 .22 .38
*
 .49
**
 .79
**
 .64
**
 .83
**
 
19. Intention to Stay t3 41 2.61 1.05  -.06 .52
**
 .74
**
 .13 -.28 .24 .25 .17 .26 .32 .11 .30 .42
**
 .60
**
 .51
**
 .83
**
 
20. Willingness to Cooperate t2 47 2.63 1.13  .09 .72
**
 .65
**
 .08 -.10 .26 .06 -.03 .42
*
 .42
*
 .24 .25 .52
**
 .56
**
 .53
**
 .55
**
 
21. Willingness to Cooperate t3 47 3.28 1.28  -.01 .64
**
 .82
**
 .19 -.12 .36
*
 .13 .07 .43
*
 .41
*
 .25 .41
**
 .51
**
 .71
**
 .58
**
 .84
**
 
22. Job Performance t2 33 2.68 .94  .11 .78
**
 .71
**
 .18 -.26 .07 .17 .22 .41 .48
*
 .22 .26 .66
**
 .74
**
 .73
**
 .65
**
 
23. Job Performance t3 32 3.05 1.08  .07 .73
**
 .83
**
 .29 -.19 .31 .34 .11 .36 .42 .26 .36
*
 .65
**
 .76
**
 .71
**
 .83
**
 
24. Open Communication t2 33 2.92 1.36  .22 .71
**
 .66
**
 .21 -.19 .26 .01 .00 .46
*
 .49
*
 .11 .06 .48
**
 .72
**
 .55
**
 .52
**
 
25. Open Communication t3 32 3.30 1.47  .21 .76
**
 .78
**
 .30 -.22 .27 .11 -.01 .51
*
 .46
*
 .16 .24 .49
**
 .85
**
 .46
*
 .67
**
 
26. Sales Growth t2 30 3.22 1.70  -.03 .34
*
 .43
*
 -.19 .64
**
 .13 .25 .00 .44 .38 .19 .05 -.07 .23 .17 .21 
27. Sales Growth t3 32 3.59 1.64  -.11 .29 .49
**
 .07 .54
**
 .18 .24 -.09 .24 .17 .15 .11 .03 .16 .18 .47
*
 
28. Realized Profit t2 31 2.95 1.53  .17 .72
**
 .77
**
 .10 -.03 .44
*
 .15 .16 .69
**
 .67
**
 .13 .23 .39
*
 .59
**
 .54
**
 .65
**
 
29. Realized Profit t3 31 3.15 1.59  .11 .53
**
 .70
**
 .28 -.09 .41
*
 .22 .05 .38 .38 .07 .24 .49
**
 .46
*
 .58
**
 .81
**
 
30. Comprehensive data collection 44 3.42 1.09  .50
**
 .06 -.01 .13 -.18 .01 -.28 .05 .18 .18 -.11 -.04 -.18 .00 .17 .10 
31. Systematic data collection 45 2.23 1.42  .27 -.07 -.13 .03 -.13 -.01 -.27 -.08 -.16 -.07 -.14 -.20 -.13 -.12 -.02 -.09 
32. Validation 45 2.19 1.43  .14 -.08 -.10 .17 -.12 -.17 -.19 .02 -.11 -.01 -.04 -.16 .01 -.03 -.01 -.02 
33. Length of Integration period  46 2.83 1.48  .00 -.14 -.13 -.19 -.20 -.33
*
 .15 .33
*
 -.39
*
 -.55
**
 .21 .13 .18 -.17 -.19 -.16 
34. Author coding 50 .30 .46  .23 .09 .06 .24 .01 -.22 .06 -.12 .04 .20 -.15 -.28 .06 -.10 .00 .03 
   *p<.05;**p<.01 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Variables  
  17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 
15. Job Satisfaction t2                   
16. Job Satisfaction t3                   
17. Commitment t3 1.00                  
18. Acceptance of Change t3 .90
**
 1.00                 
19. Intention to Stay t3 .83
**
 .81
**
 1.00                
20. Willingness to Cooperate t2 .57
**
 .61
**
 .49
**
 1.00               
21. Willingness to Cooperate t3 .88
**
 .92
**
 .79
**
 .61
**
 1.00              
22. Job Performance t2 .65
**
 .68
**
 .55
**
 .80
**
 .58
**
 1.00             
23. Job Performance t3 .86
**
 .85
**
 .76
**
 .69
**
 .85
**
 .84
**
 1.00            
24. Open Communication t2 .74
**
 .68
**
 .51
**
 .77
**
 .68
**
 .70
**
 .69
**
 1.00           
25. Open Communication t3 .80
**
 .85
**
 .63
**
 .73
**
 .76
**
 .67
**
 .78
**
 .90
**
 1.00          
26. Sales Growth t2 .22 .43
*
 .25 .41
*
 .33 .20 .22 .19 .19 1.00         
27. Sales Growth t3 .42* .54** .47* .38* .53** .21 .44* .22 .33 .87** 1.00        
28. Realized Profit t2 .65** .75** .52** .72** .64** .68** .67** .72** .69** .47* .53** 1.00       
29. Realized Profit t3 .74** .79** .71** .66** .80** .65** .79** .68** .71** .32 .60** .80** 1.00      
30. Comprehensive data collection .05 -.01 -.09 -.06 .00 -.09 -.11 .11 -.07 -.03 -.15 .00 .00 1.00     
31. Systematic data collection -.11 -.19 .02 -.21 -.14 -.39
*
 -.32 -.13 -.24 -.05 -.06 -.24 -.11 .48
**
 1.00    
32. Validation .07 -.06 .11 -.26 -.08 -.38
*
 -.22 -.09 -.11 -.25 -.09 -.16 -.08 .27 .78
**
 1.00   
33. Length of Integration period  -.05 -.24 -.03 -.31
*
 -.21 -.26 -.22 -.34
*
 -.30 -.34 -.22 -.32 -.32 -.15 .20 .47
**
 1.00  
34. Author coding .11 .01 .02 .11 -.02 .14 .14 .07 -.02 -.05 .07 .18 .18 -.06 -.01 .21 .11 1.00 
     *p<.05;**p<.01                    
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Table 2 
Results of Regression Analyses of Trust on Antecedent Variables
 a 
Predictors   Trust t1 Trust t2 Trust t3 
Collaboration History 
β  
R2 
(n)                        
 -.03 
.00
 
(40) 
.18 
.03
 
(42) 
.13 
.02
 
(42) 
Takeover Friendliness /
 c
  /
 c
 /
 c
 /
 c
 
Power Differential  
 
β  
R2 
(n)                        
 .17 
.03
 
(43) 
.02 
.00
 
(48) 
.12 
.02
 
(48) 
Relative Performance 
β  
R2 
(n)                        
 -.25 
.06
 
(37) 
-.09 
.01
 
(41) 
-.07 
.00
 
(41) 
Cultural Similarity 
β  
R2 
(n)                        
 -.03 
.00
 
(42) 
.27 
.07
 
(47) 
.30 
  .09*
 
(47) 
Retained Autonomy 
β  
R2 
(n)                        
  
/
 b
 
 
 
/
 b
 
 
.12 
.01
 
(48) 
Integration Speed  
β  
R2 
(n)                        
 
/
 b
 
.18 
.03
 
(32) 
.39 
  .16*
 
(32) 
Cultural Tolerance and  
Sensitivity 
β  
R2 
(n)                        
  
/
 b
 
 
.47 
   .22**
 
(45) 
.36 
  .11*
 
(45) 
Reward and Job Security 
Enhancement 
β  
R2 
(n)                        
  
/
 b
 
 
 
/
 b
 
 
.39 
    .13**
 
(43) 
Communication Quality 
 β  
R2 
(n)                        
  
/
 b
 
 
 
/
 c
 
 
.79 
    .55***
 
(43) 
a  
Estimates are standardized regression coefficients. R2 = increment in R2 after controlling for case 
study design characteristics. 
b
 Not defined for this measurement point. 
c
 Could not be tested due to poor interrater reliability of measure. 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 3  
Results of Regression Analyses of Post-acquisition Integration Outcomes on Trust
a
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C
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m
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a
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S
a
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s 
G
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 R
ea
li
ze
d
 P
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 Trust t1 
β 
R2 
(n) 
 
/
 b 
 
 
/
 b 
 
 
/
 b 
 
 
/
 b 
 
 
/
 b 
 
 
/
 b 
 
 
/
 b 
 
-.03 
.00 
(29) 
.09 
.01 
(31) 
 
 Trust t2 
β 
R2 
(n) 
.49 
.24
** 
(37) 
 
/
 c 
 
 
/
 c 
 
 
/
 c 
 
.75 
.54
*** 
(42) 
.69 
.32
** 
(27) 
.65 
.31
** 
(32) 
.29 
.08 
(31) 
.46
 
.18
* 
(31) 
 
 Trust t3 
 
Β 
R2 
(n) 
.79 
.63
*** 
(38) 
.83 
.69
*** 
(46) 
.85 
.62
** 
(44) 
.74 
.55
*** 
(39) 
.82 
.68
*** 
(45) 
.74 
.48
*** 
(31) 
.73 
.50
*** 
(31) 
 
/
 b 
 
 
/
 b 
 
a 
Estimates are standardized regression coefficients. R2 = increment in R2 after controlling for case  
study design characteristics. 
b
 Not defined for this measurement point. 
c
 Could not be tested due to poor interrater reliability of measure. 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 4 
Results of Regression Analyses of Integration Outcomes on Trust Antecedents Before and After Controlling for Trust
a 
Predictors  
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a
ct
io
n
  
C
o
m
m
it
m
en
t 
 
A
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
 o
f 
C
h
a
n
g
e 
 
In
te
n
ti
o
n
 t
o
 S
ta
y
  
W
il
li
n
g
n
es
s 
to
 
C
o
o
p
er
a
te
  
J
o
b
 P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
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p
en
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
  
S
a
le
s 
G
ro
w
th
 
R
ea
li
ze
d
 P
ro
fi
t 
 
Cultural Similarity 
β 
R2 (before controlling for trust) 
R2 (after controlling for trust) 
(n)  
 
 
.33. 
11
*  
.03 
(37) 
 
.30 
.09
* 
.00 
(46) 
 
.32 
.10
* 
.01 
(44) 
 
.28 
.08  
/
 c 
(39) 
 
.38 
.15
** 
.01 
(45) 
 
.35 
.12
* 
.03 
(31) 
 
.22 
.04 
/
 c
 
(32) 
 
 
/
 b
 
.38 
.13
* 
.05 
(31) 
 
Integration Speed 
β 
R2(before controlling for trust) 
R2 (after controlling for trust) 
(n)  
 
.32 
.10
 
/
 c
 
(24) 
.41 
.17
* 
.01 
(32) 
.49 
.24
** 
.02 
(32) 
.32 
.10
 
/
 c
 
(30) 
.41 
.17
* 
.00 
(33) 
.43 
.18
* 
.01 
(21) 
.29 
.06
 
/
 c
 
(22) 
 
 
/
 b
 
.29 
.08
 
/
 c
 
(20) 
Cultural Tolerance  
and Sensitivity 
 
β 
R2(before controlling for trust) 
R2 (after controlling for trust) 
(n)  
 
.22 
.05
 
/
 c
 
(35) 
.40 
.16
** 
.03 
(45) 
.29 
.08
 
/
 c
 
(43) 
.30 
.09 
 
/
 c
 
(39) 
.41 
.16
** 
.06
 
(44) 
.08 
.01
 
/
 c
 
(27) 
.15 
.02
  
/
 c
 
(32) 
 
 
/
 b
 
.16 
.03
 
/
 c
 
(31) 
Reward and Job 
Security Enhancement 
β 
R2(before controlling for trust) 
R2(after controlling for trust) 
(n)  
 
.42 
.18
* 
.00 
(36) 
.55 
.30
** 
.03 
(43) 
.41 
.16
** 
.00 
(41) 
.42 
.18
** 
.01 
(39) 
.51 
.27
** 
.02 
(42) 
.53 
.24
** 
.03 
(32) 
.42 
.17
* 
.01 
(32) 
 
 
/
 b
 
.42 
.17
* 
.03 
(31) 
Communication 
Quality 
β 
R2(before controlling for trust) 
R2 (after controlling for trust) 
(n ) 
 
.61 
.37
** 
.00 
(36) 
.75 
.56
*** 
.02 
(42) 
.75 
.51
*** 
.02 
(41) 
.60 
.36
** 
.00 
(39 
.71 
.50
*** 
.01 
41) 
.67 
.38
** 
.03 
(29) 
.79 
.58
*** 
.12
**
 
(30) 
 
 
/
 b
 
.39 
.14
* 
.01 
(28) 
a 
Estimates are standardized regression coefficients. R2 = increment in R2 after controlling for case study design characteristics. 
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b 
The first two conditions for mediation specified by Baron and Kenny (1986) are not met. 
 c
 The third condition for mediation specified by Baron and Kenny (1986) is not met, i.e., R2 before controlling for trust is non-significant. 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Appendix 
Case Survey Sample  
Case title Primary reference 
Number 
of pages 
Publication 
Status 
HQ 
Country 
Acq:er 
HQ 
Country 
Acq:ed 
Combi-
nation 
year 
2 ACo / 2 Bco Bastien, 1987 3 Journal USA USA /b 
Age/ Nouvelle 
Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1996 
14 
Research 
Book 
France GB /
b
 
Anglo American/  
Gas Appliances 
Hubbard, 1999 15 
Research 
Book 
GB GB 1991 
AON Singapore Francesco, 2003 12 
Research 
Book 
USA 
Singa-
pore 
1996 
Bank A/ Bank B 
Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989
a
 
24 
Research 
Book 
USA USA 1980 
Baxter T./ American 
Hospital Supply 
Ulrich, 1998 17 Journal USA USA 1985 
Borroughs/ Sperry 
Mirvis and Marks, 
1992 
79 
Research 
Book 
USA USA /
b
 
Brio/ Alga Larsson, 1990 4 
Doctoral 
Dissertation 
Sweden Sweden 1982 
Casco/ Nordsjö Larsson, 1990 34 
Doctoral 
Dissertation 
Sweden Sweden 1983 
CBG/ Blackwell 
Kets de Vries and 
Florent, 1996 
7 
INSEAD 
Case 
Switzer-
land 
GB 1995 
Ciba/ Sandoz 
Rühli and Sachs, 
1999 
10 Journal 
Switzer-
land 
Switzer-
land 
1997 
ComNet/ Net Co Buono, 1997 11 Journal USA USA 1994 
Daimler/ Chrysler 
Blasko, Netter and 
Sinkey, 2000 
25 Journal Germany USA 1998 
DBS/  
Thai Danu Bank 
Wilson, 
Williamson and 
Chua, 2000 
32 
INSEAD 
Case 
Singa-
pore 
Thailand 1997 
DC/  Grand Co 
Sales and Mirvis, 
1984
 a
 
85 
Research 
Book 
USA USA 1978 
Discovery/ 
Scottish Yeast 
Hubbard, 1999 13 
Research 
Book 
GB 
GB 
(Scotl.) 
/
b
 
Drake/ Cecil Graves, 1981 25 Journal GB GB 1974 
48 
 
Appendix 
Case Survey Sample (continued) 
Case title Primary reference 
Number 
of pages 
Publication 
Status 
HQ 
Country 
Acq:er 
HQ 
Country 
Acq:ed 
Combi-
nation 
year 
Electrolux/ Zanussi 
Ghoshal and 
Haspeslagh, 1990 
20 Journal Sweden Italy 1984 
Enka/ 
Glanzstoff 
Olie, 1996
 a
 101 
Doctoral 
Dissertation 
Nether-
lands 
Germany 1969 
Fast Car/  
Greenside Motors 
Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1996 
29 
Research 
Book 
GB GB /
b
 
Fast Car 
/ Princess G. 
Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1996 
29 
Research 
Book 
GB GB /
b
 
Fill-it 
Packaging 
Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1996 
14 
Research 
Book 
GB GB /
b
 
Fokker/  
VFW 
Olie, 1996
 a
 116 
Doctoral 
Dissertation 
Germany 
Nether-
lands 
1969 
Gable/ Apex 
Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1996 
16 
Research 
Book 
GB GB /
b
 
Global Products/  
Johnson 
Hubbard, 1999 13 
Research 
Book 
USA GB 
Betw.1985 
and 1989 
Global Products / US 
enterprise 
Hubbard, 1999 3 
Research 
Book 
USA USA 
Early 
90ies 
Harris 
Semiconductors/ 
GESS 
Schweiger, Ridley 
and Marini, 1998 
30 
Research 
Book 
USA USA 1988 
Herrick/ 
Lawson 
Arnold, 1983 2 Journal /
b
 /
b
 /
b
 
High Tech/  
computer firm 
Buono and Nurick, 
1992 
13 Journal USA /
b
 Late 80ies 
Hoogovens/ Hoesch Olie, 1996
 a
 124 
Doctoral 
Dissertation 
Nether-
lands 
Germany 1972 
HP/ Apollo  
Mirvis and Marks, 
1992 
20 
Research 
Book 
USA USA /
b
 
Intel/ 
DEC Semiconductors 
Zollo and 
Crawford, 2000 
32 
INSEAD 
Case 
USA USA 1997 
Int. Nickel of 
Canada/ ESB 
Ravenscraft and 
Scherer, 1987 
20 
Research 
Book 
Canada USA 1974 
49 
 
Appendix 
Case Survey Sample (continued) 
 
Case title Primary reference 
Number 
of pages 
Publication 
Status 
HQ 
Country 
Acq:er 
HQ 
Country 
Acq:ed 
Combi-
nation 
year 
Kone Cranes/  
GH Carruthers 
Risberg, 2001 22 Journal Finland 
GB 
(Scotl.) 
1989 
Kone Cranes/ 
Wisbech R. 
Risberg, 2001 22 Journal Finland Norway 1973 
Microsoft/ Vermeer  
Nanda and 
Levenson, 1997 
22 Harvard Case USA USA 1996 
Mutual/ Colony Arnold, 1983 2 Journal /
b
 /
b
 /
b
 
1 Sco/ 1Jco Bastien, 1987 3 Journal USA USA /
b
 
Service Conglomer./ 
Quality Guarding 
Hubbard, 1999 19 
Research 
Book 
GB GB /
b
 
SKF/ Prototyp 
Larsson, Petersson 
and Krauss., 1994 
53 Unpublished Sweden Germany 1986 
SKF/ ATB 
Larsson, Petersson 
and Krauss., 1994 
49 Unpublished Sweden 
Nether-
lands 
1988 
SKF/ Jacob 
Larsson, Petersson 
and Krauss., 1994 
1 Unpublished Sweden 
Switzer-
land 
1987 
Suburban/ 
Town Hospital 
La Farge et al., 
2003 
19 
Research 
Book 
USA USA 1991 
TeleCable G. / 
Infosys 
Hubbard, 1999 16 
Research 
Book 
GB GB /
b
 
Texaco/ Getty Oil Altendorf, 1986 214 
Doctoral 
Dissertation 
USA USA 1984 
Toyo Ink / Francolor 
De Meyer and 
Probert, 1998 
21 
INSEAD 
Case 
Japan France 1993 
Trans Co/  
Coop Foods 
Buono & 
Bowditch, 1987 
21 
Research 
Book 
USA USA 1987 
Transway/Sero / 
Intertrans 
Blake and Mouton, 
1985 
16 Journal USA GB 1982 
Trucking A/  
Trucking B 
Larsson, 1990 6 
Doctoral 
Dissertation 
Sweden Sweden 1983 
United Bank/ 
Community  Bank 
Napier, 1989 18 Journal USA USA 1984 
